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IMPROVING CONTRACTS THROUGH EXPANDING
PERSPECTIVES OF UNDERSTANDING'
THOMAS D. BARTON*
I. OVERVIEW AND PURPOSE
As conventionally understood, the point of making a contract is to
manage risks by constructing a legal future that will be carried out
regardless of what the real world future may bring. Parties bind
themselves to particular behaviors by voluntarily assuming legal
duties in exchange for consideration or legal rights. Parties may
summon the full power of the state - through legal judgment
obtained in court - to assure performance of contractual duties or to
extract compensation from a party who has breached those duties.
Judging from surveys, however, business leaders are not fully
satisfied with how contracts conventionally function. According to
data gathered by the International Association of Contract and
Commercial Managers (IACCM), businesses overwhelmingly seek
more flexibility and innovation in their arrangements than contracts -
as conventionally understood - provide.' Perhaps as a consequence,
0 Copyright Thomas D. Barton, 2015. All Rights Reserved. This article is
adapted from an earlier version bearing the same title that appeared in the October,
2013 conference proceedings of the Academic Forum of the International
Association of Contract and Commercial Managers: PROCEEDINGS OF THE 2013
IACCM ACADEMIC FORUM ON INTEGRATING LAW AND CONTRACT MANAGEMENT:
PROACTIVE, PREVENTIVE AND STRATEGIC APPROACHES (2013). The author wishes
to thank Nancy Kim and Joanna Sax for their helpful review of the manuscript, and
the editors of the California Western Law Review for their capable and thoughtful
suggestions.
* Louis and Hermione Brown Professor of Law, California Western School of
Law, San Diego, California
1. In a poll taken among the members of the IACCM, nearly ninety percent
said that "flexibility and greater agility" is important for their contracts.
Commitment Matters, Stuck in a Negotiation Rut, http:/commitment-
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contracts frequently do not operate according to the conventional
understanding and arguably never have. 2 Where a dispute arises about
promised behaviors, data gathered more than half a century ago
revealed business executives to be strikingly reluctant to resort to
litigation to coerce performance or damages. 3
We are left with the puzzling and unsettling picture of contracts.
On the one hand, it is a vital legal, social, and economic institution.
On the other hand, it is often viewed skeptically, if not outright
ignored, by its creators and users. Reforms seem advisable to align
the design of contracts better with their actual use. Yet both contract
design and the general understanding of their usefulness are resistant
to significant change.' Perhaps this is because of organizational or
matters.com/2011/09/21/stuck-in-a-negotiation-rut/ (last visited May 20, 2013). See
also Peter Roberts, Complexity calls for flexibility, AUSTL. FIN. REv., Oct. 13, 2011
(complex project management).
2. This was first described in 1963 by the seminal research of Stewart
Macaulay (Stewart Macaulay, Non-contractual Relations in Business: A Preliminary
Study, 28 AM. SOCIOLOGICAL REV. 55 (1963), and has been replicated since then
(see Stewart Macaulay, The Real and the Paper Deal: Empirical Pictures of
Relationships, Complexity, and the Urge for Transparent Simple Rules, 66 MOD. L.
REV. 44, 46-47 (2003)). See also Ian R. MacNeil, THE NEW SOCIAL CONTRACT
(1980).
3. See Macaulay, Non-contractual Relations in Business, supra note 2, at 1;
see also Iva Bozovic & Gillian K. Hadfield, Scaffolding: Using Formal Contracts to
Build Informal Relations in Support of Innovation, S. CAL. L. REv., SELECTED
WORKS OF GILLIAN K. HADFIELD, Jan. 21, 2013,
http://works.bepress.com/ghadfield/48. Bozovic and Hadfield reinforce Macaulay's
findings, but note important differences where contracts were made in contexts that
business people self-reported as "innovative." Id. Contracts in innovative settings
drew far more planning and periodic review during implementation. Even so, the
parties were no more willing to use formal litigation for enforcement. Id. For an in-
depth empirical study and analysis of business litigation patterns, see Ross E. Cheit
& Jacob E. Gersen, When Businesses Sue Each Other: An Empirical Study of State
Court Litigation, 25 L. & SOC. INQUIRY 789 (2000). See also the discussion of the
related work of Ian MacNeil & Oliver Williamson in Kate Vitasek, Katherine
Kawamoto, & Gerald Stevens, Unpacking Outsourcing Governance: How to Build a
Sound Governance Structure to Drive Insight Versus Oversight,
https://www.iaccm.com/members/library/?id=391 l#top, (last visited May 22, 2013).
4. According to the IACCM Agility Survey of May, 2010, conducted from 252
participants, "while a large majority feel that they must become more flexible and
innovative in the terms and related commercial policies, the scope of envisaged
change appears very limited. . . . The survey implies awareness . .. that change is
needed and that it would be welcomed by executive management. Yet in general,
34 [Vol. 52
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conceptual barriers to reforms, or perhaps because business leaders
see contracts as serving different purposes than conventionally
understood. Regardless of the reasons, this disjuncture between
conventional meaning and real-world behavior raises questions: how
much more valuable could contracts be if they were consciously
designed to suit the uses actually made of them? How might contracts
and contracting practices grow so as to function more strongly in ways
that business people describe as desirable?
This article posits that the conventional understanding of contracts
is constructed primarily from a legal perspective. That in itself is
virtually self-evident, but not nearly so visible is how that legal
perspective begins to influence a related set of ideas and structures
that accompany the legal perspective. Core understandings of social
institutions (or "paradigms") typically have this systemic quality: the
core meaning or approach has spill-over effects for other connected
practices, institutions, or concepts. Usually, however, we do not stop
to consider these connections or the pattern of mutual influences.
Their influence is real, however. Understanding contracts generally
through a legal perspective has systemic influences on how companies
are organized; how personnel communicate internally and externally;
how and by whom strategic planning proceeds; what is identified as a
contract problem, and the conceived structure of that problem; the
procedures with which problem should be addressed; and what counts
as success or failure in resolving the problem.
If one were to change or expand the basic perspective by which
contracts are understood, then suddenly all of those associated
concepts and structures could also become more open to new ideas.
The purpose of this article is to make more explicit the basic
assumptions by which we understand contracts and suggest how the
many connected functions are influenced by those core assumptions.
The article also explores how our basic perceptions about contracting
might change, and how the associated business ideas and structures
might also change, if we were to imagine contracts from two
alternative perspectives: the economic exchange that is the substance
there is little evidence that the contracts and commercial community is responding
by identifying the mechanisms and changes needed to facilitate greater flexibility
and agility. This is clearly a missed opportunity." INTERNATIONAL ASsOCIATION
FOR CONTRACT AND COMMERCIAL MANAGEMENT, Agility Survey, 2.
2015] 35
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and basic purpose of contracts, and the personal relationships that go
into making and implementing an agreement.
Importantly, this article is not arguing that the legal perspective is
not valuable, or that it should be significantly reduced. Legal rules
and state enforcement are vital aspects of contracting. However, it
should not be the exclusive way to imagine how and why contracts
function. For many commercial actors - regardless of whether
legally trained - the legal perspective has too strongly captured their
imagination about contracts. Taken together, the legal perspective and
its corollary concepts seem to constrain innovation in contract design
and contracting practices. To accelerate reform efforts and enable
better contracting practices, this article suggests supplementing our
understanding of contracts by viewing contracts from these two
alternative perspectives: (1) economic exchange, and (2) personal
relationships.
II. THE LEGAL, ECONOMIC, AND PERSONAL
RELATIONSHIPS OF CONTRACTING
Contracting practices can be understood from at least two
additional perspectives that are inherent to every contract: (1) the
economic exchange of the contracting parties, and (2) the personal
relationships of those parties. Analyzing contracts through the lenses
of those two perspectives reveals expanded functions of contracts and
suggests different means for preventing and solving problems that
may emerge from contracts. Understanding contracting practices
from all three perspectives (legal, economic, and personal) could
ultimately affect the design of agreements; the organizational
structures and communication patterns in which contracts are planned,
negotiated, and implemented; and efforts to measure the significance
and success of contracting practices. In short, expanding the frame of
reference for understanding contracts may remove long-standing
obstacles to innovation in contracting practices.
A. The Conventional Understanding of Contracts
To underscore and elaborate the conventional (legal)
understanding of contracts, the agreements are typically regarded as:
36 [Vol. 52
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(1) a document;5 that (2) contains an arms-length, voluntarily
bargained-for exchange that binds performance 6 and articulates legal
rights and responsibilities of future conduct;7 and that (3) extracts
compensation' from the breaching party, or requires actual
performance of the contractual duties,9 if a promise is broken without
a good excuse.
This conventional understanding is correct, so long as one is
viewing contracts from a purely legal perspective. This article argues,
however, that the conventional understanding is inherently
incomplete. At least two alternative perspectives are always present
in contractual arrangements; the assumptions and values of which
should augment our understanding of contracts.10
The first alternative perspective emerges from the economic
exchange itself i.e., what is being bought and sold, and on what terms.
The second alternative perspective inheres in the personal relationship
5. In the U.S. business-to-business context, agreements will normally be
written. Sales of goods transactions for more than $500 must be in writing. U.C.C. §
2-201 (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM'N 1977). Documentation of service
agreements is not so frequently required, although services not performable within
one year must be in writing. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 130
(AM. LAW INST. 1981).
6. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §§ 15-17 (AM. LAW INST.
1981).
7. As pointed out by Ian MacNeil, all contracting is "exchange projected into
the future." Ian MacNeil, The Many Futures of Contracts, 47 S. C. L. REv. 691
(1974). (A promise about future conduct is what distinguishes a contract from an
immediate sale or service transaction).
8. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 347 (AM. LAW INST. 1981).
9. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 359 (AM. LAW INST. 1981).
10. Certainly some voices are skeptical about incorporating strong relational
values into the more traditional legal meaning of a contract. Douglas K. Newall, for
example, cautions:
[T]here is a difference between a relationship and a contract. Not every
action has legal consequences. The promoters of a good faith duty of
assistance [by one contracting party on behalf of another] are blurring the
line between law and society. Relational values are important and society
has relational ways to enforce them (if you behave like a sleaze your
reputation will suffer). As Macaulay suggests, most parties to close
relations will never see the courthouse. Law, however, is about drawing
lines, setting limits, and establishing rights.
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between the parties making the agreement. Both of these perspectives
generate distinct alternative understandings about contracts that may
be conscious or may be just below conscious recognition. The
alternative meanings also carry implications for how companies might
better organize, plan, and communicate regarding contracts. These
possibilities remain largely unrealized, however, because the power of
the conventional law-based meaning tends to shove aside the
assumptions and implications of the alternative perspectives.
In the paragraphs below, the article walks systematically through
the three elements comprising the conventional understanding of
contracts: (1) a document; (2) that establishes the parties' legal rights
and responsibilities; and (3) that summons the power of the state
through formal legal processes, if need be, to enforce those rights. We
compare how those elements might be otherwise understood from the
standpoint of the alternative perspectives. We must emphasize that
the legal perspective is not "wrong," nor should it be abandoned. It
should, however, be complemented by a thoughtful inclusion of the
economic and personal perspectives. Those perspectives do not in
themselves substantially change the legal rules." Perhaps they should
not do so or at least not do so radically. Yet broadening our
understanding of contracts by distinguishing legal and non-legal
perspectives may reveal opportunities to improve contracting practices
with some additional positive side-effects.
B. Conceiving Contract as a "Document".: Does that hold back
organizational restructuring and better communications?
1. The Economic Exchange Perspective
As a first example, consider the conventional understanding that a
contract is a document. A business person focusing exclusively on the
economic exchange might well see a contract as the summary of a
commercial process, rather than as a document. From a purely
business perspective, making and implementing a contract implies
11. See Melvin A. Eisenberg, Why There is No Relational Law of Contract, 94
Nw. U. L. REv. 805 (2000) (explaining why "insights into the economics and
sociology of contracting" do not produce "a body of meaningful and justified
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moving from perceived commercial opportunity or need, to a search
for an appropriate contractual counterpart. After finding the
appropriate counterpart, the parties follow up with negotiation,
implementation, quality control adjustments, cost or delivery re-
negotiation, and payment. If all goes well, the parties may then move
to another transaction, or a longer, broader relationship.
Particularly striking is that understanding the contracting process
from this perspective does not begin and end by creating a set of
legally binding rights and duties. It is more of a process-oriented
"life-cycle" image of contracting which is dynamic rather than static
and includes timelines that both precede and follow the signing of the
agreement. A process image implies movement and coordination
among a variety of people who, at various stages of a contract, will
have quite different responsibilities within a business for
sales/procurement, costing out, negotiating, producing, assessing
quality, collecting or paying, and, finally, dealing with troubles or
disputes.
Seeing contracts through the economic exchange perspective also
suggests stronger attention to internal organization and
communication for each party - a focus on lowering costs and
maximizing both short-term and long-term revenue streams.
Understood as a process, a contract can represent a focal point for
developing and implementing strategic goals, measuring how well
integrated the commercial operations may be within a company, and
for gaining important feedback about the quality of products and
services. None of those goals are necessarily implied by the purely
legal understanding of a contract, perhaps because contract law arose
in settled, agrarian economies characterized by much simpler
operations and transactions.
2. The Personal Relationship Perspective
Now look at contracts yet differently - this time solely through
the lens of the personal relationship of the parties to an agreement.
Would not a contract represent a significant connection that places the
parties in a relationship of dependency, reciprocity, and (hopefully)
good faith, cooperation, and trust?' 2 Parties to a personal relationship
12. See Daniel Markovits, Contract and Collaboration, 113 YALE L J. 1417
(2004). Cheit and Gersen explore and verify the hypothesis that business litigation
2015] 39
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would probably not describe their nexus as a "document." Instead,
they would describe the attributes of a commercial connection in
which each party typically becomes vulnerable to the other. One or
both parties may have made payments to the other. Almost always,
one or both would have invested in the other internally or to third
parties, in reliance on the eventual performance of the contractual
counterpart. The parties would probably have assessed the
dependability and trustworthiness of one another,13 their reputation for
quality, and their cooperativeness in the event of a dispute. They may
perceive cultural issues, especially in international contexts, which
must be comprehended and overcome. One or both may have a sense
that the connection could extend beyond the immediate contract,
toward future transactions or perhaps deeper integration.1 4
If enhancing the economic exchange perspective suggests better
internal integration and communication within a commercial
contracting party, then enhancing the personal relationship perspective
does the same externally - to the communication patterns between
the contracting parties. One would expect far more information to be
will be more frequent in those industries that are structured to permit more
anonymity in dealing-where barriers exist, in other words, to the formation of
long-term continuing relationships. Cheit & Gersen, supra note 3, at 804-07.
13. Matthew Jennejohn has described an irony of modem economies. As
transaction costs have fallen over the past decades, economies have "de-
verticalized," that is, more firms have chosen to contract externally for operations
they would have "owned" internally. Doing so is typically more efficient because
contracting with a specialist, rather than performing functions in an integrated firm,
captures a stronger division of labor. However, these newly outsourced functions
tend to be more asset-specific and therefore are more susceptible to "hold-up" or
opportunistic behaviors by contract counterparts. Moral hazards rise as economies
shift more operations away from property rights and into contracting arrangements,
especially where the outsourced operations are innovative and not easily reduced to
complete, precise contract language. Taken together, the trends of de-verticalization
make trust and dependability in contracting partners ever more important. Matthew
Jennejohn, Collaboration, Innovation, and Contract Design, 14 STAN. J.L. Bus. &
FIN. 83, 84-87 (2008).
14. "[C]ompanies may gradually build a strategic alliance through the
sequencing of a number of discrete contracts followed by an agreement for
continuing collaboration. The strategic beauty of such a preconceived scheme is that
the contracting parties can test each other's capabilities and reliability before
agreeing to a long-term arrangement." Larry A. DiMatteo, Strategic Contracting:
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shared, and for that information to be communicated with a stronger
regard for the possible need to make ongoing adjustments. The
conventional understanding of contracts, even while attending in a
formal way to the creation of a voluntary agreement between
contracting parties, does not imply the level or type of communication
that would be expected from focusing on the parties' personal
relationship. Indeed, conventional legal concepts posit two parties
keeping their distance from one another - at "arm's length" - to
legitimate the idea that they are each bargaining from self-interest.
Furthermore, including the commonplace "merger" clause into the
contract is intended to discharge the legal significance of any prior
agreements or understanding of the parties.15  Classic contract law
thus purports to constrain the relationship of the parties to nothing
more than what is represented in the text of the agreement.
C. Contract as "Establishing Legal Rights and Responsibilities":
Does that narrow the perception of how contracts
function and manage risk?
Clearly one important function of contracts is to establish the legal
rights and responsibilities of the parties. It is the central focus of the
legal perspective. 16  Yet as with the analysis above, we ask: what
15. See Kerry L. MacIntosh, When are Merger Clauses Unconscionable?, 64
DENV. U. L. REv. 529 (1988).
16. The primary architect of the U.C.C., Karl Llewellyn, had an expansive
understanding of contracts that is worth re-capturing:
I propose to ring changes, perhaps ad nauseam, on three simple facts: first,
that law observance is a question not of legal rules, but of the formation of
folkways that can be and will be learned chiefly without direct reference to
particular rules; second, that law and folkways alike are not general and
common to our society, but are different and specific according to groups,
occupational and other; and third, that for mass, as contrasted with
individual, attempts at control, the problem of lawmaking and of law
enforcement centers on informed, sustained effort to find the particular
persons whose conduct is concerned, and to devise means for affecting the
conduct patterns of those particular persons.
Karl N. Llewellyn, Law Observance Versus Law Enforcement, in Proceedings of the
Conference of Social Work 127 (1928), reprinted in Karl N. Llewellyn,
JURISPRUDENCE: REALISM IN THEORY AND PRACTICE 399 (1962), quoted in Allan R.
Kamp, Uptown Act: A History of the Uniform Commercial Code: 1940-1949, 51
SMU L. REv. 275, 284 (1998).
2015] 41
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additional functions of contracting might be visible through the
alternative lenses of economic and/or personal relationships? Do
those functions suggest a different approach to risk management?
How might contracts improve if they were consciously designed to
discharge those functions, or designed to approach risk, in these
alternative ways?
1. The Economic Exchange Perspective
From the economic exchange perspective, this article has already
suggested a broader range of contract functions when one's vision is
expanded from the purely legal perspective. More specifically, the
planning, negotiation, implementation, and adjustment of contracts
may aid strategically in a variety of company policies, including
which company operations should be integrated within the company
and which should instead be outsourced.1 7 Contracting can also help
determine long-term approaches to gaining market share and
reputation, versus securing high rates of immediate return. It can help
a company assess the levels and skills required of its personnel hiring.
Staging contract performance in advance will help make inventory
levels more efficient.' 8  Such a practice can help make costs more
transparent at every level of company operations, provide feedback for
quality control, and even improve aspects of internal company
governance.
More broadly yet, embedded in each alternative perspective on
contracting is a distinct understanding of how future uncertainties
should be managed. "Establishing legal rights and responsibilities" is
the "legal" approach to risk. This approach attempts to manage an
uncertain future by constructing, and assuring, an artificial future that
17. "Contracts and contract law lie at the core of procurement and sales, and
all business functions and activities-including research and development, finance,
accounting, strategy, human resources, information technology, operations
management, outsourcing, and networking-depend on the success of the
contracting process." George Seidel & Helena Haapio, Using Proactive Law for
Competitive Advantage, 47 AM. BUS. L.J. 641, 667-68 (2010); see also Steven R.
Salbu, Joint Venture Contracts as Strategic Tools, 25 IND. L.J. 397, 407-11 (1991)
(focusing on the roles of lawyers, managers, and contracts in the strategic planning).
18. See Jennejohn, supra note 13, at 113 discussing "just in time" inventory as
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is not uncertain. Instead, through contract, the parties enlist the state's
help in defining, ex ante, what the future will look like in terms of
item demand, availability, pricing, delivery costs, and financing rates.
Legal rights and duties regarding some future transaction, even years
hence, are locked in from the moment of contract formation. Apart
from exceptional cases where serious intervening events result in
excusing a performance because of "impracticability,"1 9 or
"frustration," 20 the future will be both predictable and secured.
The legal approach to risk - stipulating a precise future through
state-enforced promises - is certainly helpful for business planning
and efficiency. The legal approach copes with risk through a
combination of the devises of stabilization, transference, disclaimer,
and indemnification. 2 1 But that is not the only approach. The data
demonstrates that in practice, business people tend to resort to
alternatives. 2 2  Before exploring those alternatives - how they
function and how they might be better institutionalized - this article
focuses more carefully on the legal devices for managing the risks that
come from an inherently unknowable future.
As to stabilization, reducing the terms of future exchanges to
enforceable promises promotes efficiency and improves timing of
investments. Security, provided through possible state enforcement of
a contract, avoids the potential instability of one party simply
changing its mind about its commitments when the time for
performance has arrived. Furthermore, within the broad limits
suggested above, contracting can (through legal fiat) stabilize various
background conditions that are beyond the parties' control. Parties
19. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 261 (AM. LAW INST. 1981).
20. Id. § 265.
21. See generally Steven B. Lesser, How to Draft Exculpatory Clauses that
Limit or Extinguish Liability, 75 NOV FL. BAR J. 10 (2001).
22. "Relational theory, which is very much attuned to parties' motivations to
contract, provides substantiation for the elimination of various enforcement and
policing mechanisms within the bargaining process." Blake D. Morant, Contractual
Rules and Terms and the Maintenance of Bargains: the Case of the Fledgling
Writer, 18 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 453, 496-97 (1996).
2015] 43
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can spell out, through force majeure clauses, the environmental
influences that will (or will not) excuse performance. 23
Contracts also permit one party to manage risks by transferring
some risks to the other party, through express conditions that either
limit one's own contractual duties 24 or force another party to assume
the risks of certain contingencies. If risks were not avoided or
transferred to the other party and ultimately come to fruition, liability
can be disclaimed (as long as the clauses are conspicuous and
carefully drafted).25 Where liability is not deflected, a contract can
require indemnification by a contract counterpart or third party
insurer.2 6 Generally, the dominance of this law-based approach to risk
management is apparent by the chronic annual appearance of
disclaimer and indemnification clauses, which are the two most
common terms included in contracts among the members of
IACCM.27 Furthermore, the fifth item on the list reveals the final
future-securing legal strategy: unavoidable liability can be specified
(and limited) in advance by inserting a liquidated damages clause.28
Yet, specifying the contours of the future through contract and
assuring that future through state enforcement are financially and
relationally expensive, and certainly not bulletproof. That approach
essentially relies on power from the state to impose a fictitious, pre-
conceived reality onto a world that actually may turn out differently
from what the contracting parties imagined. By analogy, think of the
legal risk-management strategy as requiring energy inputs, sometimes
considerable energy, to resist entropic trends toward a simpler state.
23. See P.J.M. Declercq, Modern Analysis of the Legal Effect of Force
Majeure Clauses in Situations of Commercial Impracticability, 15 J.L. & COMM.
213 (1995).
24. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §§ 224-229 (AM. LAW INST.
1981).
25. See, e.g., U.C.C. 2-316 (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM'N 1977);
Stephen E. Friedman, Text and Circumstance; Warranty Disclaimers in a World of
Rolling Contracts, 46 ARIZ. L. REV. 677 (2004).
26. See James E. Joseph, Indemnification and Insurance: The Risk-Shifting
Tools (Part I), 79 PA. BAR Ass'N Q. 156, 160-65 (2008).
27. IACCM, 2012 Top Terms in Negotiation, 5,
https://www.iaccm.com/library/?id=461 1, (last visited June 14, 2013).
28. Id. See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 356 (AM. LAW
INST. 1981); U.C.C. 2-718(1) (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM'N 1977).
44 [Vol. 52
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Sometimes, the power is inadequate or the effort to produce that
power is just not worth the required resources.
From the economic perspective, risk management may look very
different than the legal approach of stage-managing the future. A
business person might see risk management as finding an appropriate
ordering device - one that could bring a tolerable level of
predictability at a reasonable cost. Over-investment in the legal model
of risk management does not make economic sense, and that
assessment is realized in practice. As recently reported in an IACCM
Report, "[t]he growing complexity of doing business in increasingly
global, volatile markets is a primary factor adding to the need for
contracting skills and capabilities. The role is shifting from its historic
focus on limiting risk to a greater need for creative, flexible
commercial terns and opportunity management.... Executive
management wants to focus more on profitability and financial risk
than legal risk. ...
Simpler, cheaper ordering devices between the parties - devices
that maintain the risks of default at an acceptable level - might
include reliance on trade customs and commercial norms; reciprocity;
or (less honorably) economic coercion, i.e., bending a party to one's
will through market power rather than legal power. Although precise
data about their relative use is unavailable, each of those devices no
doubt plays some role in the documented tendency of business
managers to forego enforcement of their legal rights through
litigation.30
Reliance on trade customs and commercial norms is commonly
used as a virtually cost-free device to prevent and resolve problems.
The practicality and sensibility of integrating trade customs into
contracts is formally acknowledged by the Uniform Commercial Code
by forming a contract for the usages that supplement the agreement as
well as help to interpret terms that are explicitly stated. 3 1 How precise
29. IACCM, Contract and Commercial Management Today: A Call to Action,
7 (2013).
30. See Macaulay, supra note 2, at 1; see also Bozovic & Hadfield, supra note
3; Cheit & Gersen, supra note 3.
31. U.C.C. § 1-205(3) states: "[A]ny usage of trade in the vocation or trade in
which [the parties] are engaged or of which they are or should be aware give
particular meaning to and supplement or qualify terms of an agreement." U.C.C. §
1-205(3) (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM'N 1977).
2015] 45
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or widespread those provisions may or may not be in various
industries is open to question.32 But in weaker, more localized and
imprecise form, the provisions may influence whether parties breach
or remain in disrupted contracts. 33
Reciprocity is the simple idea that parties will honor their
commitments when the exchange remains valuable to them, because if
a party breaches, they can expect reciprocal behavior from their
counterpart. 34 Self-interest, in other words, can be harnessed to ensure
that promises are kept. In planning contracts, therefore, parties should
not seek agreements that transfer so many risks to the other side such
that the other party regards the overall agreement as only marginally
valuable. When an agreement is significantly unbalanced, a small
shift in the commercial environment may tip such a party over the
edge - simply because keeping one's promises no longer seems
important or feasible to the potentially breaching party.35  Hence,
finding "balance and integrity" in the terms rather than shifting as
many risks as possible to the other side36 increases the chance that
32. See Lisa Bernstein, The Questionable Empirical Basis of Article 2's
Incorporation Strategy: A Preliminary Study, 66 U. CHI. L. REv. 710 (1999).
33. While skeptical that trade usages exist as generally acknowledged or
precisely stated as the drafter of the UCC may have imagined, Bernstein nonetheless
sees observance of even "weaker" commercial norms as valuable markers as to
"whether the other transactor is a cooperator or a defector." Id. at 717. The power
of social expectation is explored by legal theorist Niklas Luhmann as a basic
building block of law. Norms are constantly generated in everyday "temporal" life;
some portion are more widely or "socially" institutionalized. When connected to
material consequences, a transcendent "meaning" emerges for the norm that
functions like law. See Thomas D. Barton, Expectations, Institutions, and
Meanings: A Review of Viklas Luhmann's "Sociological theory ofLaw, " 74 CAL L.
REv. 1805, 1806 (1986).
34. See Scott Fruehwald, Reciprocal Altruism as the Basis for Contract, 47 U.
LOUISVILLE L. REv. 489 (2009).
35. As practiced business executives know, another risk to seeking an
agreement that forces one party to shoulder heavy risks is that such party may, in the
event of trouble, become financially incapable of carrying through with its promises.
Tim Cummins & Jacqui Crawford, Webinar conducted under the auspices of
IACCM, https://www.iaccm.com/members/library/files/AskTheExpert-Recording
- Jacqui_Crawford-April l 0.mp3 (last visited June 14, 2013) [hereinafter Webinar].
36. Tim Cummins, Contracting Excellence: Achieving Balance Through
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both parties will have incentives to perform throughout the
agreement's entirety. By limiting total risks and enforcement costs,
such an approach may actually increase value for both parties - even
for a party that might have had the market power to force a
significantly unbalanced contract.
This last point introduces the final possible alternative "ordering
device" from the perspective of economic exchange: coercion or
domination of a party through market power. This device mirrors, in a
sense, the use of contracts to enable parties to rely on the power of
contract and the state to structure the future. With enough market
power, one party does not need to resort to legal enforcement. Indeed,
those with overwhelming power would be tempted to overreach in
ways that would not find legal support. Hence, turning to the legal
system would be riskier than simply bending another to one's desires
through threats of withdrawal.
Domination operates ironically: it has low transaction costs
because neither formal enforcement mechanisms nor negotiation is
required in the relationship. Indeed, relationships built on domination
can even appear stable. Yet, those on the receiving end of domination
usually know of their subordinated state and may seek to "right the
balance" when the opportunity presents itself.3 7 Relationships built on
domination are therefore inherently precarious.
Intellectual property licensing agreements serve as a case in point.
In those agreements, the licensor has a legally-conferred monopoly
power in the form of a patent or copyright or the licensor may be
permitting use of a process that is part of their trade secrets. The
licensee has limited choice; even if the licensor's terms seem
unreasonable, the licensee does not have any other options because the
licensor is the only available contracting partner. Hence, those
agreements demonstrate instances of contracts built largely on
relationships of market power domination. Such contracts carry
special risks, however, because of the built-in incentive of the
subordinated party to find stronger value than the monopoly pricing of
the contract. Below, Ronald A. Cass and Keith N. Hylton describe
contracts involving licensed trade secrets:
37. See M.P Baumgartner, Social Control from Below, in I TOWARD A
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[I]f the [trade secret] formula has a general scope of application,
then it will be valuable to many firms, in different industries. The
formula will have a market value that can be ascertained easily by
looking at the additional profits generated by its use. Over time, the
formula will be sold or licensed to other firms; even if licenses are
accompanied by contract provisions binding licensees to maintain
secrecy, as dissemination occurs in this fashion, there is a
substantial likelihood that the formula will no longer remain a
secret. In short, the ordinary pressures of the market are likely to
ensure that a formula of general application that is potentially
valuable in many production processes will not remain a secret for
a long time. 38
Seeking domination as a risk-management strategy, in other words,
may be less stable and more costly than seeking a fair collaboration. 3 9
1. The Personal Relationship Perspective
The parties' perspective, based on their personal relationship,
might also suggest alternative "ordering devices" apart from relying
on legal rights and responsibilities. From the relational perspective,
the alternative devices might be social expectation,4 0 and trust. These
two methods are mutually reinforcing, but once again we have no
empirical data to measure precisely their relative use.
As with the devices of the economic exchange perspective,
however, we can infer that each may have at least some influence.
Bozovic and Hadfield conclude from their interviews of
representatives from twenty-nine manufacturing and service
companies: "Past practices and norms, and not the contract, are the
reference point for judging the quality of [a] partner's effort and
direct, open communication is key to problem solving." 41 They quote
the following sorts of interview comments: "We talk to everybody,
it's. . . mostly conversation. I got a problem I call somebody; I call
38. Ronald A. Cass & Keith N. Hylton, LAWS OF CREATION: PROPERTY
RIGHTS IN A WORLD OF IDEAS 90 (2013).
39. See generally Cummins, supra note 36.
40. See discussion concerning Niklas Luhmann, Barton, supra note 33.
41. Bozovic & Hadfield, supra note 3, at 14.
48 [Vol. 52
17
Barton: Improving Contracts Through Expanding Perspectives of Understandi
Published by CWSL Scholarly Commons, 2015
IMPROVING CONTRACTS
somebody on the phone and we deal with it ... It's all trust."4 2 And
"I have very little interest in going forward with any sort of contract
with anybody that I remotely trust, because I would rather just agree
to a one-pager that broadly outlines the deal."43
a. Social Expectation
People enmeshed in personal relationships are significantly
influenced by the expectations they have for the other party to the
relationship, as well as for themselves.44 In general, people comport
themselves to social circumstances. Exactly what may be deemed
appropriate requires social sensitivity, and carrying out those
expectations in positive ways demands social skill.45 If we view
commercial dealings through the lens of such personal relationships,
we could draw a quick distinction between norms that evolve through
mutual interactions and adjustments of the parties, versus norms that
are sought to be imposed through the contract terms (and the law).
Through their interactions that may extend for years, parties build up
reciprocal norm expectations. "Long-term continuing relations have
their own norms and sanctions that will serve to get almost all
contracts carried out in an acceptable fashion if not precisely to the
letter of the contract documents."46 This differs from what we would
see through a legal lens: the formation of legal entitlements -
legitimate demands that may be made on another, virtually regardless
of circumstance (that is much of the point of making it "legal").
Viewed legally, one party has purchased rights or entitlements against
42. Id. Apart from their insights into executive thinking, Bozovic and
Hadfield's work is also helpful in describing the business context in which contracts
are most strongly planned, and referred to during the process of implementation.
Those business leaders who characterized their companies as innovative were more
likely to use contracts in those ways than executives who characterized their
businesses as not innovative. Id. at 5-8. Where norm expectations are already
strong, as in more settled industries, formal contracts are less important. Where, in
contrast, norms are not yet well evolved, the contract provides a useful guide for
both parties as to what may be legitimate behavioral expectations of one another. Id.
43. Id. at 44.
44. See discussion conceming Niklas Luhmann, Barton, supra note 33.
45. Baumgartner, supra note 37.
46. Stewart Macaulay, Freedom from Contract: Solutions in Search of a
Problem?, 2004 WIs. L. REv. 777, 788-89 (2004).
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another - and if the consideration is paid then nothing else is
required. "Entitled" parties act differently toward others than toward
those with whom one has collaborated (which is recognized in the
negative connotations when one uses the word "entitled" to describe
another's demeanor).
Unlike legal entitlement, norm expectation is built gradually,
rather than concluded at the point of formation of the contract. Norm
expectation is flexible, relatively ill-defined, and understood to
involve some history of reciprocity. Notwithstanding its relative
informality, expectations can be very powerful in influencing people's
behaviors - and the reactions to those behaviors.47 Relationships can
deteriorate because of some misunderstanding or mismatch of
expectations. Open and ongoing communication helps people to
adjust or calibrate those expectations and prevent feelings of injustice
or disrespect.
Social expectations such as an ordering or risk management
device may work better in some settings than in others. For example,
in addition to their insights into executive thinking, Bozovic and
Hadfield's work is also helpful in describing the business contexts in
which contracts are most strongly planned and referred to during
implementation, and those contexts in which contracts are created, but
rarely consulted. 48  Those business leaders who characterized their
companies as innovative were more likely to plan and use contracts
intensively; those executives who characterized their businesses as not
innovative tended to use form contracts that they then ignored.4 9 This
characterization based on innovative versus traditional industries
makes sense. Where norm expectations are already strong, as in more
settled industries, formal contracts are less important; where, in
contrast, norms are not yet well evolved in innovative settings, the
contract provides a useful guide for both parties as to what may be
legitimate behavioral expectations of one another.50  Cheit and
Gersten offer a different, but not inconsistent, idea: that informal
47. See Samuel H. Pillsbury, Emotional Justice: Moralizing the Passions of
Criminal Punishment 74 CORNELL L. REV. 655, 676-77 (1989).
48. "[Distributors] have pretty extensive contracts that we sign with them for
exclusivity.... No one ever looks at the things.... [Y]ou throw the thing in the
drawer. " Bozovic & Hadfield, supra note 3, at 12.
49. Id. at 16.
50. Id. at 5.
50 [Vol. 52
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norms are relied upon more strongly where underlying economic
conditions are strong, with formal legal processes being used more
often when economic conditions tighten.5 1 When economic survival
is at stake, social expectations become less compelling.
b. Trust
Trust is arguably distinct from social expectations, although
clearly the ideas support one another. "Trust is the glue that binds
couples, communities, and countries. Societies without a sufficient
wealth of trust cannot function efficiently, sometimes cannot function
at all." 52 Social expectations create standards and pressure for how
parties ought to behave. Those expectations - like legally-backed
contract terms themselves - can create a foundation for building
trust.5 3 When behavior standards are unclear, trust may become the
default ordering device. In some circumstances, no customary norm
exists. But where trust prevails, the other party can nonetheless be
relied upon to eschew possible exploitation, even if particular
behaviors cannot be predicted.
Trust as a social regulator is certainly different than the law: "In
theory, law makes trustworthiness unnecessary, even obsolete. When
law is fully in command, morality itself loses relevance." 54 That may
be over-stated, but a different proposition may be more easily
defended: when trust vanishes, people turn to law.
Yet trust and the law are not mutually exclusive - as suggested
above, they can work together. That is what should happen in the
process of creating and implementing a contract. People in
relationships can feel more secure and trusting where traditional legal
51. Cheit & Gersen, supra note 3, at 804-07.
52. Christopher R. Leslie, Trust, Distrust, and Antitrust, 82 TEX. L. REv. 515,
517 (2004).
53. Frank B. Cross, Law and Trust, 93 GEO. L.J. 1457 (2005).
54. Donald Black, SOCIOLOGICAL JUSTICE 85 (1989). Conversely, "[i]f all
parties were truly trusting, they would feel no need for legalized protections, and
devoting time, effort, and resources to such protections would be entirely wasteful."
Cross, supra note 53, at 1482.
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rights are available for support if needed. 5 Conversely, even the most
traditional defenders of rights-based liberalism typically "lead their
lives in relationships of trust and reciprocity rather than standing on
their rights."56 Thus, clear contractual language may enhance the
power of relationship and trust to work through problems. 5 7
Just as important, however, are the ongoing discussions among
the parties about the commitments they have made: "the development
of trust-based relationships generally requires effective
communication." 8  In experimental work based on Prisoner's
Dilemma scenarios, "[c]ommunication seems to have a linear
relationship with trust. The more time that subjects have to
communicate, the greater their cooperation; the more communications
that are exchanged, the greater the cooperation." 59 Time, therefore,
becomes important: it is difficult to build trust without some period
during which dialogue and loyalty testing may proceed. 60 As we shall
see below, contract design should be reformed to speed and intensify
communications among the parties, and thereby facilitate building
trust.
D. Contracts as Coercive Enforcement
The final element of the conventional understanding of contracts
relates to governance: the state will mandate performance of contract
duties, or extract some monetary compensation for failure to perform.
The conventional understanding conjures images of litigation, even
55. Robert E. Goodin, Structures of Political Order: The Relational Feminist
Alternative, in NOMOS 38 POLITICAL ORDER 498 (Ian Shapiro & Russell Hardin,
eds. 1995).
56. Id. at 513.
57. Cross, supra note 53, at 1482-83. In some Asian cultures, to demand that
an agreement be reduced to written expectations may be a source of distrust. Donna
Stringer & Lonnie Lusardo, BRIDGING CULTURAL GAPS IN MEDIATION, 56-OCT
DISPUTE RESOLUTION 29, 38 (2001).
58. Leslie, supra note 52, at 538.
59. Id. at 538-39.
60. Matthew Jennejohn, supra note 13, at 98 ("the key premise to relational
contracting is time. Long-term interaction is usually necessary for informal norms to
substitute for formal rules. Without long-term interactions, firms are not concerned
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courtroom proceedings. That is not an illegitimate image, but it is
incomplete.
Conventional notions of contract governance certainly generate
images of legal procedures. Just as strong (even if far less intuitive)
are related default ideas about: (1) what constitutes, and how does one
describe, a problem worthy of resort to such procedures; (2) what
skills are associated with resolving that problem; and (3) what
constitutes success or failure in resolving the problem, and how
should that be measured? Each of these related ideas is answered
differently by the three perspectives of legal, economic, and relational.
The construct behind this analysis bears repeating: each distinct
perspective understands "contract" differently, but each of the three
frameworks comprises a distinctive system of thought. Contracts are
devices for a very basic and ancient sort of human connection, a bond
created through voluntary exchange. Hence, we should not be
surprised that each separate understanding of the device entails a
distinctive clumping of associated concepts: the nature and structure
of problems; the procedures for addressing such problems; the skills
required to operate those procedures, and even the differing images of
human motives or behaviors that engage one another in those
distinctive ways. To assess the consequences of deferring too strongly
to the legal perspective, these different understandings of the clumped
ideas should be considered in greater detail.
1. The Legal Perspective
From the purely legal perspective, understanding contract
governance as formal legal enforcement means seeing "problems" as
those behaviors that would call forth possible vindication through
legal rules. In other words, a legal problem is one that is raised by
some possible violation of a legal rule that can be addressed through
legal procedures, and which in turn can be measured through damages
or an order for specific performance. From the legal perspective, if a
disagreement concerning a contract does not implicate some rule
violation, then there is no problem. The issue may involve an
inadequately drafted contract or poor business judgment, but a legal
problem does not exist (unless such shortcomings are so severe as to
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More specifically, the purely legal perspective does not view the
lack of real value in a contract as problematic, so long as
consideration exists. Similarly non-problematic is the lack of
flexibility in the contract or in a contracting party: neither is a problem
because neither is demanded by legal rules. Nor, typically, is the
failure to perform by one's "best efforts" a problem unless specifically
mandated in the contract. Nor is it legally worrisome that the parties
have failed to communicate in a way that would help build product
quality or opportunities for expansion or innovation in the exchange.
2. The Economic Exchange Perspective
Virtually the opposite prevails from the perspective of the
economic exchange. Most of the above shortcomings suggest that the
exchange will fail to deliver optimal value, which from the economic
standpoint, is the purpose of making the contract. So what constitutes
a "problem" is perceived quite differently from the two perspectives.
Certainly, failure of the contract to generate profit is a problem when
viewed from the exchange perspective. Problems, viewed from the
economic exchange perspective, also include a contract's lack of
flexibility, failure to use best efforts, and failure to optimize
opportunities for product quality, enhanced efficiency, or development
of new markets.
Furthermore, when we look at procedures for addressing
problems, we learn from Macaulay and others that executives prefer
re-negotiation rather than resorting to litigation. This difference in
preferred or customary procedures - between the lawyer's litigation
and the manager's re-negotiation - entails further differences in what
constitutes important skills and knowledge. Operating legal
procedures requires an advocacy mindset, linguistic and infrastructure
information, and a license that is essentially exclusive to lawyers.
This may be a supplementary reason why management dislikes
litigation: it marginalizes their participation in dispute resolution to
that of a user or role-player rather than designer. In contrast,
negotiation is far more accessible, flexible, and participatory. The
skills required for its successful operation differ significantly from
advocacy in litigation, and can be fully mastered by those who lack
legal training. Finally, employing negotiation as a problem-solving
method inherently transforms the structure of the problem. Seen
54 [Vol. 52
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through legal eyes, problems are structurally binary and absolute
(behavior is either within the legal rules, or it is not). In negotiation,
by contrast, problems are structurally incremental or probabilistic,
which accords with an economic or market-based outlook and
contributes to their flexible resolution.
3. The Personal Relationships Perspective
What is a "problem" from the personal relationships perspective?
The failure of post-formation communication is problematic, along
with the rancor and adversarial positioning that may accompany legal
trouble. What procedures tend to clump with viewing contract
problems from this perspective? A relational rift is typically
addressed through honest communication. That could entail
negotiation, but it could also entail a surrender of self-interest,
apology, or request of forgiveness - procedures for addressing
problems shorthanded here as "healing."
The skills required for interpersonal healing are still different than
those required in litigation or in negotiation. "Empathy," for example,
certainly has a stronger role in relational communication than in
litigation, and somewhat more than in negotiation (although empathy
is an important skill of successful negotiation). 6 1 The same applies to
"compassion," "grace," "guilt," or "shame": such moral/psychological
concepts must be at least understood, and perhaps accepted, in the
world of repairing personal relationships. Structurally, relational
problems are rarely understood as absolute or binary - if they are so
regarded, then the relationship is probably threatened. Relational
problems reflect the contingent, provisional qualities that characterize
negotiation issues, but relational problems often have a deeper level of
causal ambiguity, and an ongoing shared responsibility.
E. Summary
As stated above, the legal perspective is not right or wrong; it is
simply incomplete. And yet its power and language tend to push out
alternative perspectives on purposes, functions, problems, procedures,
61. See Robert H. Mnookin, Scott R. Peppet, & Andrew S. Tulumello,
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and skills in the world of contract formation and governance. By
teasing out the economic and personal relational perspectives of each
of the three elements that comprise the conventional understanding of
contracts, we can better understand what each perspective may have to
offer. The next step is to build contracting practices that take all three
perspectives into account. This short article can only suggest
movements already underway, and encourage future innovation
toward that goal.
III. USING MULTIPLE PERSPECTIVES TO
REFORM CONTRACT PRACTICES
A. Contract Design
In an insightful article, 62 Matthew C. Jennejohn suggests a re-
framing of contracts that better integrates the legal, economic, and
relational perspectives analyzed above. Terming it "generative
contracting", Jennejohn suggests that recent innovations reveal
"parties ... using contracts to build novel governance systems that
limit opportunism by immersing parties in joint learning processes. "63
Understanding contracts as moveable platforms for communicating
information would incorporate aspects of each of the three
perspectives. The model also implicates the need to integrate contract
design with information design. 64
At least in the highly dynamic industries on which Jennejohn
based his study, contracts as a learning process begins to look like an
amalgamation of all three frameworks. Viewed as a learning process:
(1) contracts are conceived as dynamic rather than static; (2)
flexibility is a virtue rather than a weakness; (3) uncertainty and
incompleteness are expected, but are viewed as important triggers of
post-formation collaboration; and (4) "hold-up" or opportunistic
62. Jennejohn, supra note 13.
63. Id. at 111 (italics added).
64. See generally Helena Haapio, Stefania Passera, & Thomas D. Barton,
Innovating Contract Practices: Merging Contract Design with Information Design,
in PROCEEDINGS OF THE 2013 IACCM ACADEMIC FORUM ON INTEGRATING LAW
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behaviors65 are minimized by harnessing multiple devices of social
ordering: reciprocity, expectations, reputation, and trust as well as
possible legal coercion.
To bolster his vision, Jennejohn cites Charles Sabel's urging of
"pragmatic governance" or "pragmatic coordination." 6 6  Jennejol1n
also cites Sabel's collaboration with others in suggesting the tools by
which pragmatic governance might be achieved: simultaneous
engineering, benchmarking, and error detection/correction
institutions. 67 Jennejohn summarizes each technique:
* 'Simultaneous engineering,"' says Jennejohn, "is a catch-
all phrase for the immediate, side-by-side cooperation
between collaborators. Also called 'concurrent'
engineering, it takes place where 'upstream' and
'downstream' steps proceed simultaneously, each taking
account of the [changes in the] requirements of the
other." 68  Jennejohn offers an illustration: "Just-in-time
production, which requires interpenetration between
collaborators to achieve the quick adjustment capabilities
necessary for minimal inventory, is a classic example of
simultaneous engineering. The close proximity necessary
for simultaneous engineering to work creates an
environment of rich information sharing, a key ingredient
for governing inter-firm relationships." 69
* "Benchmarking" is more familiar. It occurs when "firms
find an idea of how to proceed by probing possibilities and
then building the results of this probing into flexible
65. See discussion of economic trends toward greater "hold-up" risks, supra
note 13.
66. Jennejohn, supra note 13, at 112 (citing Susan Helper, John P. MacDuffie
& Charles Sabel, Pragmatic Collaborations: Advancing Knowledge While
Controlling Opportunism, 9 INDUS. & CORP. CHANGE 443 (2000)).
67. Helper, MacDuffie & Sabel, supra note 66, at 445, cited in Jennejohn,
supra note 13, at 113.
68. Jennejohn, supra note 13, at 114 (quoting Charles Sabel, A Real-Time
Revolution in Routines, in THE FIRM AS A COLLABORATIVE COMMUNITY, 106
(Charles Heckscher & Paul Adler eds., 2006)).
69. Jennejohn, supra note 13 at 114 (citing John K. Halvey & Barbara Murphy
Melby, INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY OUTSOURCING TRANSACTIONS: PROCESS,
STRATEGIES, AND CONTRACTS, 138-39 (2d ed. 2005)).
572015]
26
California Western Law Review, Vol. 52 [2015], No. 1, Art. 3
https://scholarlycommons.law.cwsl.edu/cwlr/vol52/iss1/3
CALIFORNIA WESTERN LAW REVIEW
development plans." 70 "Benchmarking typically involves
two closely related processes: prototyping and searching.
In benchmarking by prototype, firms purposefully depart
from proven models, develop a range of potential products,
and test these potentials, often with consumers. This
iterative dialogue, between collaborating firms and/or
between collaborators and possible customers, sets the
course for production. When firms benchmark through
search, they look to industry experience for comparable
approaches." 71
* "Error Detection and Correction" is a simple idea that can
be difficult to implement. It is "the process for changing
rules that were originally approximated through
benchmarking.... As collaborators continually detect and
correct errors in design and production as they perform,
they adjust the rules that they are to follow." 72 Although
Jennejohn does not speak explicitly in terms of feedback
loops in system design, his suggested technique of error
detection and correction is similar. The goal is to uncover
information about systemic flaws that is deep enough to
identify root causes73 so that the design itself can be
corrected and prevent future mistakes. Practices that
encourage (or require) error reporting have proven
effective, for example, in gradually improving medical
practices. 74
Jennejohn's analysis fits especially well within the networked
economy that increasingly characterizes innovative industries, and is
borne out in several empirical studies that he describes. But the
integrative vision of contract as a set of meeting points, or what
Jennejohn calls a "modular learning system,"75 can have broader
application. The prerequisite for effectively using techniques like
simultaneous engineering, benchmarking, and error detection and
70. Jennejohn, supra note 13 at 114.
71. Id. (citations omitted).
72. Id. at 115-16.
73. Id. at 116.
74. Edward A. Dauer, The Role of Culture in Legal Risk Management, in 49
SCANDINAVIAN STUDIES IN LAW 93, 98-99 (2006).
75. Jennejohn, supra note 13, at 140.
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correction is a willingness to communicate effectively and
collaboratively. Forming a contract purely from legal perspective
does not necessarily communicate effectively because the language is
dense and some of the concepts are inaccessible to non-lawyers. Nor,
from the purely legal perspective, does the implementation and
governance of the contract necessarily promote collaboration: the
insistence on legal rights as entitlements can actually discourage
pragmatic interchange.7 6  A more integrative understanding of the
multiple perspectives of contracting widens our eyes to the importance
of good communication and points toward possible ways to improve
communication and understanding.
Finally, one should note that broader perspectives are not
necessarily achieved by merging the legal department of a company
with the contract management division. Given historic patterns of the
tendency of the legal perspective to dominate communications, such a
merger can sometimes decrease the alternative voices. That may be
why, for example, data gathered by IACCM reveals that "in a few
instances, this integration [of Legal and Contract Management] is
viewed as having curtailed commercial creativity and resulted in some
loss of flexibility in favor of an emphasis on legal issues at the
expense of other business and stakeholder interests."77
B. Effective and Collaborative Communication
1. Visualization
"Visualization" refers to work by Helena Haapio, Stefania
Passera, and others that can be a vital foundation for re-framing
contracts.7 8 Visualization is dedicated to designing contracts in ways
that enable understanding and ongoing communication by all those
who may have some role in the contracting process beyond simply the
76. Mary Ann Glendon, RIGHTS TALK: THE IMPOVERISHMENT OF POLITICAL
DISCOURSE 1-9 (1991).
77. IACCM, supra note 29, at 9.
78. See, e.g., Haapio, Passera, & Barton, supra note 64; Stefania Passera &
Helena Haapio, Transforming Contracts from Legal Rules to User-centered
Communication Tools: a Human-Information Interaction Challenge, 1 COMMC'N
DESIGN Q. 38 (2013); Thomas D. Barton, Gerlinde Berger-Walliser, & Helena
Haapio, Visualization: Seeing Contracts for What They Are, and What They Could
Become, 19 J. L. BUS. & ETHICS 47 (2013).
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lawyers. That class of people includes: engineers, financial analysts,
contract managers, sales and procurement staff, and management
generally. Visualization assumes that contracts can function toward
better planning, internal organization, quality control, and innovation
- the broader, largely unmet potential for contracts. That potential
will not be achieved, however, unless the contract is actually planned
by a variety of stakeholders and used as an ongoing guide for
implementation and re-negotiation. However, that goal may be
impossible unless the contracting process is well designed and
complemented by explicit terms that are accessible to all parties
through effective information design.7 9 As IACCM summarizes the
priorities of global one hundred companies: "Simplification remains
an important objective; the reduction of bureaucracy and unnecessary
rules reduces costs."80
Visualization employs a variety of techniques - natural
language, timelines, diagrams, graphs, maps, flowcharts, icons,
decision trees, and photographs." Its aims were recently summarized
as follows:
1. Clarifying what written language does not manage to fully
explain;
2. Making the logic and structure of the documents more
visible;
3. Giving both overview and insight into complex terms and
processes;
4. Supporting evidence, analysis, explanation, and reasoning
in complex settings;
5. Providing an alternative access structure to the contents,
especially to the non-experts working with the document;
6. Helping the parties articulate tacit assumptions and clarify
and align expectations; and
7. Engaging stakeholder who have been alienated by the
conventional look and feel of contracts. 82
79. See generally Haapio, Passera, & Barton, Innovating Contract Practices,
supra note 64.
80. IACCM, supra note 29, at 12.
81. Barton, Berger-Walliser, & Haapio, supra note 78, at 48.
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One need not be a professional designer to make contracts far
more clear, accessible, and useful to the broad range of company
personnel whose everyday activities are guided by those contracts.
Understanding the broader functions and perspectives of contracts can
stimulate any drafter's imagination to design the document so that it
can be used effectively to not only inform the parties of their rights
and responsibilities, but to also prompt continuing communication
between the parties.
2. Collaboration
Commercial relationships that depend entirely on trust and
goodwill do not fare as well as relationships that couple relational
qualities with baseline contractual expectations - i.e., trust that is
"entwined within explicit contract terms." 83 This statement, based on
Jennejohn's pulling together of empirical studies, is consistent with
the Bozovic and Hadfield analysis relating norm expectations with
perceptions about importance of formal contracts. In older industries
- especially ones with few players - established industry norms
mean that the parties who contract in such contexts tend to pay less
attention to contract drafting, and tend to consult contracts less in the
event of a dispute. 84 In contrast, contracts made within dynamic,
innovative industries in which the norms are weak or non-existent
tend to draft careful, explicit agreements and to consult them
frequently.8 5  Norms from some source - either informal social
norms within the relevant commercial community or explicitly
agreed-upon norms within the contract - seem crucial as a
foundation for the parties finding some mutual adjustment that avoids
resort to legal coercion in the event of trouble.
Explicit contract rights and duties (together with expectations
from trade custom and other sources) thus seem to be helpful but not
sufficient for creating collaboration among the contracting parties. If
so, what more can be supplied to stimulate collaboration?
At the planning and negotiation stages, the parties can think
through the entire life-cycle of the exchange. They can design, to the
83. Jennejohn, supra note 13, at 102.
84. Bozovic & Hadfield, supra note 3, at 5.
85. Id. at 6-7.
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extent possible, a system that includes simultaneous engineering,
benchmarking, and error detection and correction. They can imagine
a process for anticipating, addressing, incorporating, and learning
from the changes that will inevitably occur over the life of a long-term
contract.8 6
Contracting parties should also understand and acknowledge their
mutual need for a relationship that is stronger than the cautious arm's
length relationship that characterizes conventional contracting. 7
Being explicit about collaborative intentions and responsibilities can
be especially useful if it is coupled with trust-building and the creation
of norm expectations. In many instances, the parties can do this by
disclosing not only their baseline expectations but also their respective
long-term strategic commercial and relational interests.8 8 Revealing
underlying interests advances both the economic exchange perspective
and the relational perspective. It also promotes finding win-win
solutions where problems emerge.
* In drafting the document, the parties can express both the
general intentions they have worked out during the
planning and negotiation stages, and also include as much
detail as possible about the process that they have devised
for periodic communication. Statements of their relational
expectations should go beyond labels, but also be open-
ended to set up basic norm expectations. In a preamble or
in the body of the contract document the parties could, for
example, explicitly pledge the following types of
cooperation:
* "to improve the quality of information they share, focusing
from the beginning on their underlying interests and the
risks they perceive;
* "to work toward clauses that share risks in a balanced way,
striving for maximal realization of both parties' interests;
86. See Tim Cummins & Jacqui Crawford, supra note 35.
87. Thomas D. Barton, Collaborative Contracting as Proactive/Preventive
Law, in PROACTIVE LAW IN A BusINEss ENVIRONMENT 122-27 (Gerlinde Berger-
Walliser & Kim Ostergaard, eds., 2012).
88. See generally the "interests" based negotiation strategy classically
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* "to communicate in regularly scheduled meetings about
the progress and quality of performances;
* "when needed, to cooperate and perhaps even provide
affirmative assistance toward another party's performance
of its contractual duties; [and]
* "to work toward understanding and accommodating the
needs of one another in response to changes, and to be
open to modifying terms where conditions suggest the
need for adjustment. ... "89
Specific detail about communication structures and scheduling is,
of course, particular to the parties' plans. Jennejohn cites helpful
examples, however, from contracts made between parties like Cisco &
KMPG, Coca-Cola & Synomyx, and Intel & Phoenix Technologies.
To operationalize simultaneous engineering, those companies adopted
measures like forming interacting teams, exchanging on-site
personnel, and creating a joint research steering committee.90 They
also fleshed out general benchmarking clauses with specific metrics.91
Then, to implement the error-detection and correction device, the
parties took measures such as establishing "an oversight body, often a
committee, which coordinates the parties' activities and oversees rule
adjustments. This committee is typically staffed by an equal number
of representatives from each collaborator and is tasked with creating a
production plan, setting benchmarks and incentives, and problem-
solving." 92
CONCLUSION
When people consider the meaning or importance of contracts,
they should be aware that the interpretation they reach is not only
about a document, nor a set of legal rights that can be enforced in the
event of a dispute. They should know that their basic understanding
about contracts will also affect their assessment of the purposes and
functions of contracts. That in turn will influence how companies
89. Barton, Collaborative Contracts as Preventive/Proactive Law, supra note
87, at 125-26 (citation omitted).
90. Jennejohn, supra note 13, at 119.
91. Id. at 120.
92. Id. at 121 (citations omitted).
2015] 63
32
California Western Law Review, Vol. 52 [2015], No. 1, Art. 3
https://scholarlycommons.law.cwsl.edu/cwlr/vol52/iss1/3
CALIFORNIA WESTERN LAW REVIEW
organize and communicate regarding contract planning, formation,
implementation, and modification. Finally, one's basic understanding
about contracts affects a range of connected ideas about what
constitutes a problem regarding a contract; the procedures by which
such problems should be prevented or addressed; the skills and
knowledge required to operate those procedures; and the nature of the
human relationships that are created through binding economic
exchange.
Understanding contracts predominately through legal perspectives
tends to overshadow alternative perspectives built on the economic
exchange itself or the personal relationships forged through the
process of making and implementing contracts. Those alternative
perspectives respond differently to each of the concepts and questions
posed above. Understanding and respecting those alternative
perspectives more strongly may unlock potential innovations in
contracting, as well as generally strengthen planning and
communication within a company. An agreement's content can be
made stronger through provisions that encourage flexibility and
collaboration, even while offering clear guidance. An agreement's
design can be made stronger through visualization. Finally, the
stability of personal relationships and potential long-term value can be
enhanced through conceiving contracts as a collaborative process of
learning more about markets, opportunities, obstacles, and the basic
interests of each partner to the agreement.
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